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Foreign policy-making in the European Union (EU) often deviates from the formal rules and is largely 
characterized by processes of informal division of labour between member states and European 
institutions. Such informal processes, which result is foreign policy-making driven by specialization, 
have largely escaped the radar of EU foreign policy scholars, but are important for fully understanding 
how the EU functions in many foreign policy dossiers. This paper presents a framework for mapping 
the different manifestations of informal division of labour and for understanding its consequences for 
EU foreign policy. 
 
Our starting point is that the political steering and operational action on EU foreign policy are 
regularly provided by an informally selected group of actors who take the lead in EU policy-making 
towards specific issues or in the EU’s relations with specific countries or regions. In other words, 
various aspects of the policy-making process are divided between multiple actors. The guiding 
principles of such division of labour are not based on formal rules, but on informal practices. This 
leads to specialization between actors and to partial segmentation of EU foreign policy-making, with 
some member states – in conjunction with the Commission and/or High Representative – being in 
the driver’s seat of specific EU foreign policy issues. Such processes of informal division of labour and 
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specialization are not only important because they can to a large extent affect the actual foreign policy 
outcomes of the EU, but also because they have an effect on broader phenomena such as the EU’s 
effectiveness and the legitimacy in the field of foreign policy. 
 
The paper is rooted in a range of empirical observations resulting from different research projects we 
conducted on EU foreign policy-making. Our empirical data finds its origins in various sources, 
including participatory and non-participatory observation in national, European and international 
decision-making processes and the study of semi-confidential documents collected through our field 
work. Despite the focus of these projects on an array of different policy domains and institutional 
settings (mainly CFSP and external environmental policies), these projects recurrently revealed that 
EU foreign policy-making is characterized by delicate processes whereby various actors take the lead 
within or on behalf of the EU. This persistently takes place below the surface of the visible policy-
making procedures. Informal division of labour and specialization thus seem to be around in many 
domains of EU foreign policy-making, but it is hard to make sense of the phenomenon as an analytical 
framework to grasp it better is lacking. This paper aims to fill that gap by presenting a framework that 
enables scholars to study more in-depth the various manifestations of informality in EU foreign policy-
making as well as its consequences. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We first embed our observations in the existing literature (section 
2). Applying an inductive approach, the paper then presents a number of empirical observations from 
the fields of CFSP and external climate change policy, which illustrate the occurrence of informal 
division of labour and specialization in EU foreign policy-making (section 3). On the basis of this 
variety of empirical observations we then provide a framework that help us to map the key 
dimensions of the different manifestations of this phenomenon (section 4) as well as the possible 
consequences for EU foreign policy-making (section 5). This mapping of the manifestations and the 
consequences is aimed to provide the necessary input and structure for further empirical research on 
informal division of labour in other areas of EU foreign policy as well as for further theorization and 
hypotheses testing (section 6). 
2. Informal arrangements in EU foreign policy-making 
We define the field of EU foreign policy, where multiple instances of informal division of labour and 
specialization can be observed, in a broad way (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 11-25). First, we 
consider it as the entirety of activities developed by the EU and directed towards the external 
environment. It not only comprises the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) but also the EU’s external action (e.g. trade and development 
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policies) and the external dimension of the EU’s internal policies (e.g. external environmental policy). 
Second, EU foreign policy is not limited to such activities developed by EU level actors (such as the 
Commission the High Representative of the EEAS), but the member states are inherently part of it. 
Third, EU foreign policy not only serves an external objective (i.e. influencing the external 
environment to which the foreign policy is targeted), but also internal objectives. Two of these 
internal objectives are important for understanding the informal processes of division of labour in EU 
foreign policy-making. On the one hand, through EU foreign policy member states also manage their 
mutual relations by giving each other the opportunity to take the lead and to play above their formal 
weight on issues that might be, for different reasons, important to them. On the other hand, by to a 
higher or lower extent including supranational actors in the informal division of labour, member 
states also employ informality as a means to pursue their objectives regarding the degree of 
integration they want to achieve in a foreign policy field. 
 
Much more than treaty provisions, competence distributions or formal rules, informality is often the 
key driver of how EU foreign policy is prepared, formulated and executed. In other words, the formal 
procedures do not provide the full story of how EU foreign policy is actually conducted as they are 
often not reflected in the actual practices. The observation mirrors the emerging literature that 
focuses on informal policy-making practices, which has led to a ‘practice turn’ in the study of 
international organizations (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Stone 2011) and to an increasing attention for 
‘informal governance’ in the study of the EU (Christiansen and Neuhold, 2013; Kleine 2014). 
 
The importance of informal arrangements in the EU has been largely recognized in the current 
literature. The political system of the EU provides fertile ground for bypassing the formal provisions 
by informal networks of policy-makers in order to make that the EU actually works (Christiansen and 
Piattoni 2003; Christiansen and Neuhold 2013). For instance, informal politics is the main driver for 
institutional change in the EU, as the main EU institutions conclude informal inter-institutional deals 
that deviate from the formal Treaty procedures but that later on codified in future Treaty revisions 
(Stacey 2010). ‘Going informal’ has also become the main modus operandi in day-to-day policy-
making, as ‘first reading agreements’, concluded between representatives of the Council and the 
Parliament in trialogues, today count for the lion’s share of adopted legislation (Héritier 2007; Reh et 
al. 2013). This points to a shift from the formal, inclusive policy-making procedures towards informal, 
secluded policy-making practices. 
 
The notion of ‘network governance’ emphases the informal dynamics of coordination, negotiation 
and continuous interaction between actors in the policy-making process (Jordan and Schout 2006; 
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Peterson 2009). Networks are formed among actors ‘who take an interest in the making of a certain 
policy and who dispose of resources (material and immaterial) required for the formulation, decision 
or implementation of the policy’ (Börzel, 1998: 259). This is surely to be seen in the informal division 
of labour and specialization in EU foreign policy-making, with member states having an interest in an 
issue, material resources (such as financial means), immaterial resources (such as expertise or 
privileged diplomatic links with or within a third county) and – we can add – also a willingness to 
commit these sources in function of finding a solution. Remarkably, the literature on network 
governance has paid little attention to (EU) foreign policy, and vice-versa, there has been little 
attention in (EU) foreign policy literature for networks and other informal dynamics. On foreign 
policy more broadly, only some publications pay attention to informal governance (e.g. Kohler-Koch 
1996; Justaert and Keukeleire 2013). However, these studies primarily analysed the nature of the 
networks in the EU and between member state actors (e.g. Krahmann 2003; Elgström and Jönsson 
2005; Mérand et al. 2011), focus mainly on interactions between member state representatives on a 
sub-systemic level such as working groups in the Council (e.g. Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Smith 
2004a), or refer rather briefly to ‘minilateralism’ and ‘core groups’ (e.g. Jørgensen 2006: 36) and 
‘concert’ approaches (Smith 2004b: 261). 
3. The elephant in the room: lead negotiators in climate 
negotiations and core groups in CFSP 
This section presents two exploratory case studies, from the domains of external climate policy and 
CFSP, to inductively analyse how informal division of labour in EU foreign policy-making occurs. 
These case studies demonstrate that the phenomenon actually exists and that the formal rules are 
often sidelined by informal practices of informal division of labour. They give us an idea about the 
nature of the division of labour we witness in EU foreign policy-making. 
Informal division of labour in the EU’s external climate change policy 
In the area of climate change negotiations, the formal rules suggest that the EU should be 
represented jointly by the European Commission and the member state holding the rotating 
Presidency of the Environment Council, thereby reflecting the shared nature of environmental 
competences in the EU (Damro 2006; Delreux 2014). In practice, such a system of ‘dual 
representation’ is only used for delivering the formal EU statements and for making EU interventions 
at the plenary meetings. For the actual negotiations, where the texts are drafted and the ‘real’ talks are 
going on, the Presidency has established an informal negotiation arrangement where the other 
member states can also be active. Also the Commission goes along with such a burden-sharing system 
since it is able to play a major role in this system. 
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Informal division of labour in the climate change domain has been introduced in 2004, when the Irish 
Presidency opted for burden-sharing with other member state as it was confronted with a lack of 
sufficient capacities to deal with all issues of the climate change negotiations on its own (Oberthür 
and Roche Kelly 2008; Delreux and Van den Brande 2013). Since then, the system has continued to 
exist under the subsequent Presidencies, although some operational details have evolved. Today, in 
the run-up to the 2015 Paris climate change conference, the EU is represented in these negotiations 
by three lead negotiators. They are well-experienced negotiators who each conduct the negotiations 
during a couple of years (without a formal end at their mandate) for a particular set of issues on 
behalf of the EU. A first lead negotiator, from the UK, represents the EU in the negotiations on 
mitigation and finance; a second one, from Germany, conducts the negotiations on mitigation, 
accounting, MRV (measuring, reporting and verification), compliance and land sector; and a third one, 
from the European Commission, speaks on behalf of the EU when markets, adaptation, loss & 
damage, the Kyoto Protocol or response measures are addressed. They work under the umbrella of 
the rotating Presidency and also enable the EU to overcome the discontinuity problem related to the 
six-monthly rotation of the Presidency. 
 
A recent tendency in the climate change domain is the increasing importance of the so-called ‘EU 
Negotiating Team’, which gathers the key EU actors during the international climate change 
negotiations and which more and more becomes the centre of gravity in the policy-making process 
on the spot. Next to the three main lead negotiators, the EU Negotiating Team is composed of five 
track coordinators (who dispatch the agenda items for the different negotiating fora of the UNFCCC 
climate change regime to the relevant actors in the EU), the permanent co-chairs of the four expert 
groups (who technically prepare the Council Working Party on International Environmental Issues, 
WPIEI), 18 cluster coordinators (who coordinate a handful of issue leads taking the lead on a 
particular set of issues such as market mechanisms, post-2020 mitigation or markets, and who are 
mostly holding the pen when EU positions are developed). The three lead negotiators, the five track 
coordinators (two from the Commission, two from the Presidency and one from Germany) and the 18 
track coordinators (four from the Commission; two from Spain, Germany, UK, Belgium and Sweden; 
and one from Portugal, Austria, France and Finland) make up a core group within the EU Negotiating 
Team. 
 
All of these different functions within the EU Negotiating Team are the result of a process of informal 
division of labour between the member states and the Commission – whereby the Commission is 
acting like a kind of (big) ‘29th member state’. They also demonstrate that multiple tasks are 
informally divided: external representation (by the lead negotiators), chairing sub-working party 
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bodies in the Council architecture (by the co-chairs of the expert groups), dispatching the work to 
various policy-making fora (by the track coordinators), and preparing and drafting EU positions (by 
the cluster coordinators and the issue leads). Hence, looking at the political practices in the EU in the 
context of international climate change negotiations reveals various instances of informal burden-
sharing, resulting in a shift of power from the inclusive WPIEI to the core group of the EU Negotiating 
Team where only 10 of the 28 member states are present (when looking at the EU Negotiating Team 
by large, i.e. including the issue leads and the co-chairs of the expert groups, officials from 18 member 
states are present). 
Informal division of labour in the CFSP 
In the area of CFSP, the Council unanimously takes the decisions for defining and implementing the 
CFSP on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council. The HR/VP, the EEAS 
and systematic cooperation between member states put the CFSP into effect, using national and 
European resources (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 61-115). Formally speaking, all member states are 
thus involved in policy-making and implementation, providing support to the idea of a ‘common’ 
foreign and security policy. However, in practice, we observe that on several foreign policy issues 
small groups of EU actors take the lead in the operationalization of EU foreign policy. One of the best-
known examples is the ‘directorate’-type activity of France, the UK and Germany in the context of the 
EU3 negotiations with Iran (together with the HR/VP) (Delpech 2004; Posch 2013). Less visible 
informal groups, which include smaller member states, are for instance the informal Contact Group 
on Afghanistan established after the military operation in Afghanistan in 2001 (with then the UK, 
Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain, the Council Secretariat and the Commission – with 
the first three being its key members) and the informal contact group on the DRCongo in the mid-
2000s (including France, the UK, Belgium as key members) (Justaert and Keukeleire 2012).  
 
The specific case of the EU Core Group on Somalia, established early 2004 in the margins of the 
Working Group on Sub-Sahara Africa and operating until the end of 2006, provides us some deeper 
insights in the processes of informal division of labour in the CFSP. The creation of this Core Group 
was a reaction on what was perceived by some member states as the too limited interest of most 
other member states in Somalia and the resulting inability of the EU to move from a mainly 
declaratory foreign policy to an active operational policy (at a moment that there was a window of 
opportunity for a negotiated solution in the Somalia crisis). The key members of the Core Group 
were the UK, Italy, Sweden and the Commission. This composition was rather remarkable, as it 
included three member states that had at that time a clear preference for an intergovernmental 
approach to EU foreign policy, but that in this specific case were willing to work closely together with 
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the Commission, as the latter could offer expertise, budgets, a presence on the ground and a 
commitment towards the issue (in contrast to most other members states). 
 
France, Germany and Finland initially participated in the Core Group meetings, but France and 
Germany refrained from further participation when asked to ‘deliver’ and to move towards a larger 
diplomatic and financial commitment. In the second half of 2004, the (Dutch) Presidency and the 
Council Secretariat General also became involved in the Core Group’s activities. This guaranteed a 
link with the institutional framework of the EU, but also raised tensions when the Dutch Presidency 
(in vain) wanted to take the lead, without being able to offer any added-value in operational terms. 
Interestingly, whereas other EU member states were in general rather indifferent towards Somalia, 
some of them became concerned when the Commission committed financial resources to Somalia 
from the ‘African Peace Facility’, diminishing the availability of funding for other policy initiatives 
(such as in Sudan or DRCongo). Following progress in the international mediation efforts in Nairobi, 
the Core Group was though recognized by the Council in March 2006 when the latter ‘welcomed the 
establishment of an EU contact group on Somalia in Nairobi to engage on behalf of the EU and in 
consultation with EU Heads of Mission in direct dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government’ 
(Council 2006: 7-9).   
 
The purpose of this EU Core Group was twofold. First, its members aimed to raise the Somali conflict 
on the CFSP agenda (e.g. by feeding the Presidency of the Council with draft texts on Somalia as an 
input for discussions in the Council). Second, the Core Group provided a platform for intensive 
consultation, coordination and joint action (mainly in Africa and in the UN context) between Sweden, 
Italy, the UK and the Commission as well as between these European actors, other international 
stakeholders and Somalian interlocutors. The Core Group was successful in 2004-2006 in stimulating a 
more active EU foreign policy towards Somalia, in coordinating and enhancing the national efforts of 
the interested EU member states and other international actors such as the World Bank and the UN, 
and in conducting negotiations with the various actors in Somalia. However, this process was brought 
to a halt in December 2006 as a result of a military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia and divisions 
between the various Somali factions (leading to a radicalisation of some of these factions, which 
created al-Shabaab) (see Barnes and Hassan 2007). 
 
The two examples from the climate change and the CFSP domains illustrate the more general 
phenomenon in EU foreign policy-making where an informally selected group of actors take the lead 
towards specific issues. Recent analyses suggest that the practice of informal division of labour goes 
well beyond the environmental and CFSP domains and that it characterizes, albeit in different 
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manifestations, EU foreign policy-making in general. In the area of development cooperation for 
instance, ‘lead member states’ sometimes play a role in the EU negotiation arrangement (Carbone 
2013). Likewise, the EU Delegation in New York, which is responsible for the EU’s external 
representation in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the EU’s upgraded status in the UN, largely relies on burden-sharing of the workload. A number 
of negotiations in the UNGA and its main committees are conducted in an ad hoc way by member 
states assisting the EU Delegation (Laatikainen forthcoming). 
4. The different manifestations of informal division of labour and 
specialization 
Manifesting itself in different ways, informal division of labour takes different shapes and occurs in 
different appearances. This section highlights six dimensions of this variation: (1) the drivers; (2) 
starting point; (3) subject; (4) embeddedness in existing institutional frameworks; (5) exclusiveness; 
and (6) durability of the informal division of labour. The identification of these dimensions of informal 
division of labour is intended to form the basis for more conceptual and empirical work on this 
political practice in EU foreign policy-making. The dimensions, as well as their possible categories, are 
outlined in Table 1. We also present how the manifestations of informal division of labour in our two 







1. Drivers for leading actors interests  X 
  expertise X X 
  capabilities X X 
 for others lack of interest  X 
  diffuse reciprocity X X 
2. Starting point delegation decision    
 self-selection   X 
 sequential combination  X  
3. Subject policy preparation agenda-setting  X 
  policy formulation X X 
 policy execution external representation X X 
  policy implementation  X 
4. Institutional embeddedness link with EU institutional framework within X X 
  outside   
 link with international ad hoc groups within  X 
  outside X  
5. Exclusiveness open and evolving participation  X X 
 closed and stable participation    
6. Durability ‘one shot’   X 
 principal modus operandi  X  
Table 1: dimensions of the different manifestations of informal division of labour in EU foreign policy-making 
Dimension 1: drivers 
The first dimension relates to the factors that drive the informal division of labour and that make that 
one set of actors takes up particular tasks and that another set of actors accept that the former punch 
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above their weight. Three types of driving factors explain why EU actors participate in systems of 
informal division of labour: interests, expertise and capabilities. 
 
First, having a particular interest on the issue at stake can explain why actors are likely to take up 
certain tasks in an informal way. It not only enables them to promote or to put their interest at the 
agenda, but it also explains why they care about playing a major role in an informal way. The interests 
that drive informal division of labour can be specific, but also more structural. An example of the latter 
are historical (e.g. relations with former colonies, such as France’s interest for some African countries) 
or geopolitical interests (e.g. relations with strategically located countries, such as Poland taking the 
lead in the EU vis-à-vis Russia). 
 
Second, taking up a particular function in the system of informal division of labour can also be driven 
by particular expertise and knowledge that are present in national administrations or even with key 
individual officials within these administrations. For instance, in the case of the EU Core Group on 
Somalia, Italy and the UK had a unique knowledge about the region that was essential for crisis-
management. During environmental negotiations in the second half of the 2000s, the negotiations on 
budgetary and financial issues of the secretariats of international agreements – which are to a large 
extent funded through national contributions of member states – were mainly conducted by an 
official of the European Commission who was considered as the main expert on that kind of issues. 
That expertise is not necessarily related to a clearly identifiable interest or to competences, but it 
equally finds it origins in pet topics that are considered to be important in bureaucratic (sub)cultures 
or even by influential individuals within bureaucratic units.  
 
Third, some actors take the lead in performing a task because they have the capabilities – or more 
capabilities than other actors – to do so. These capabilities can be diplomatic (e.g. privileged 
relationships with third countries, diplomatic networks), administrative (e.g. staff and budget in 
bureaucratic units), financial (e.g. running projects or having funds available for a specific topic), 
material (e.g. military presence in a certain area) or immaterial (e.g. credibility or reputation). 
 
Member states can use these interests, expertise and capabilities to pursue their own national foreign 
policy objectives, but they can also opt to put them at the disposal of the EU. Systems of informal 
division of labour enable member states to increase the leverage of these drivers as they can be 
backed by the EU instead of by a single member state. In other words, what drives actors to informally 
take the lead in EU foreign policy-making is an anticipated multiplier effect on their interests, 
expertise and capabilities. This seems only possible, however, when these are complementary – or at 
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least not contradictory – with the interests, expertise and capabilities that are already deployed at the 
EU level. 
 
Why do the other actors then allow that some of their fellow member states take up certain tasks, as a 
result of which the former are likely to lose grip over EU foreign policy-making? A lack of interests and 
a logic based on diffuse reciprocity explain for their acceptance. First, in many cases, member states 
lack interest in the foreign policy priorities of other member states (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 
125-126). The vast majority of member states are only interested in a limited range of topics, third 
countries or regions. They are largely indifferent towards the rest of the world or the rest of the issues. 
Consequently, they do not oppose a stronger role for other actors, even if this implies that the center 
of gravity of the policy-making process moves towards an informal forum in which they are not 
present. 
 
Second, as the member states are aware that certain issues are more important for some of them than 
for others, they mutually tolerate that certain member states play above the weight on one issue as 
long as others can do the same thing on another issue. Diffuse reciprocity between member states 
indeed allows for such informal practices to emerge (Lewis 2000). A tacit understanding that all actors 
can be involved in systems of informal divisions of labour when they want to – and when they want to 
invest in specialization – indeed creates a situation where they allow one another to specialized in the 
issues they prefer. This ultimately leads to ‘national fiefdoms’ in the EU, which are informal spheres of 
control by member states on their preferred area of activities (Kleine 2013). 
Dimension 2: starting point 
How does the arrangement based on an informal division of labour start? How are the actors who take 
the lead appointed as for instance a member of a core group (in CFSP) or as a lead negotiator or 
cluster coordinator (in climate change negotiations)? The starting point of the informal division of 
labour can occur under three forms: through delegation by the Council, through self-selection or 
through a sequential combination of these two. 
 
First, informal division of labour can have its origins in a decision by the EU to delegate a certain task 
to a particular (group of) actor(s). As it happens in the sphere of informal practices, such a decision is 
not a formal one, but usually takes the shape of an understanding among the member states in a 
working group or a committee of the Council. Hence, in this scenario, the 28 member states, the 
Commission and/or the EEAS (which attend the meetings in the Council) agree that some of them 
will informally take the lead in conducting a particular task. In practice, such a decision is taken by 
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agreeing upon a document, in most cases tabled by the Presidency and including the names of the 
actors (and often even the names of the individuals) to whom a task is informally delegated. 
 
Second, instances of informal division of labour can be the result of a self-selection process, where 
actors with a particular interest, expertise or capability emerge or manifest themselves as the most 
natural ones to conduct a task on behalf of the EU. A subtle process of self-profiling seems to be at 
work here. When their candidacy remains uncontested, the actors take up a task without having been 
explicitly nominated by the other member states. The aforementioned lack of interest by the other 
member states to a large extent explains why self-selection processes are often not challenged and 
lead to EU foreign policy-making based on informal division of labour. 
 
Third, the starting point of specialization is often the combination of a rather organic emergence of 
the most suited candidates for taking up the informally divided task (i.e. the self-selection dynamic) 
followed by an approval by the other member states (i.e. the delegation dynamic). Key players in the 
EU usually consult behind the scenes about who would be a good candidate for a particular task. They 
therefore rely on their own assessment of who would be qualified for such a function and on the 
profiling of certain member states or individuals who conduct subtle lobby campaigns towards the 
key players. The possible scenarios are then bilaterally checked with the other relevant actors to 
examine if there are no objections against a country or an individual taking up that task. Only when 
the field is cleared and no objections have been identified the candidate is proposed to the 
committee or the working group in the Council, which rubberstamps that arrangement. In any case, 
controversies and open debates in the Council on the informal appointment of actors are at all cost 
avoided. 
Dimension 3: subject 
What is the nature of the tasks that are informally divided between the actors in the EU? Two sets of 
tasks are subject to such informal processes: policy preparation and policy execution. First, policy 
preparation refers to the process through which an EU position or an EU approach is substantively 
shaped. It includes agenda-setting practices whereby a certain set of actors has a large influence on 
the issues and perspectives used by the EU in a particular foreign policy dossier. In many cases, it is 
only because of the actors that are part of the informal division of labour that a topic emerges on the 
EU’s foreign policy agenda. The approach chosen to address that topic is frequently to a large extent 
influenced by the perspective of the actors taking the lead. The latter is important because it indicates 
that agenda-setting goes well beyond putting an issue at the EU agenda. It also includes the 
opportunity to frame an issue from a particular perspective, which might ultimately affect the 
substance of the EU’s foreign policy choices. After the agenda is set and the issue is framed, informal 
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division of labour is also important in the actual formulation of foreign policy proposals. There are 
many examples of lead member states holding the pen when preparing draft EU position papers that 
are then approved by the relevant body in the Council. The role of the issue leads in climate change 
negotiations, who are each responsible for drafting EU positions on the technical issues at the agenda 
of the international climate change negotiations, illustrate this dynamic. 
 
Second, the responsibility for policy execution is often informally divided. This includes, on the one 
hand, the external representation of the EU. Here, the subject of informal division of labour is thus 
speaking on behalf of the EU. An obvious example of this practice is the negotiation arrangement in 
international climate change negotiations, where lead negotiators play a key role. On the other hand, 
EU foreign policies can also be implemented on the field by specific member states without a formal 
mandate to do so. Particularly member states that can put a particular resource – such as the 
activation of their diplomatic network or the use of national funds and budgets in third countries – at 
the disposal of the implementation of EU policies are likely to take up a leading role here. 
Dimension 4: institutional embeddedness 
The group of actors that emerges from the informal division of labour can be embedded in existing 
institutional frameworks or they can function in isolation from the other formal or informal decision-
making fora. First, informal division of labour can take place within or outside the institutional 
structure of the EU. On the one hand, meetings of working groups or committees in the Council can 
for instance be prepared by a subgroup of member states, possibly together with EU institutions such 
as the Commission or the EEAS. An inner circle of interested actors thus pre-cooks decisions in 
smaller circle before they are presented to the formal decision-making forum. Likewise, when lead 
negotiators go back and forth between the EU and the international negotiations, their work is still 
largely connected to the EU’s institutional framework. On the other hand, once being established, 
informal division of labour can also evolve increasingly disconnected from the EU institutions. If that 
is the case, it becomes an arrangement that no longer puts its activities at the disposal of the Council 
and serves the EU as such, but it rather turns out to be an intergovernmental undertaking between 
countries that also happen to be EU member states but do not necessarily act in that capacity then. 
 
Second, informal division of labour in EU foreign policy-making can take place within or outside ad 
hoc groups at the international level. Indeed, the EU, European member states and/or third 
countries can also form international ad hoc groups or coalitions, such as contact groups or ‘Friends’ 
groups in the context of the UN. In the negotiations in the context of the Non Proliferation Treaty, for 
instance, several member states are involved in informal groups which promote different objectives in 
these negotiations. An example is the ‘Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative’, aiming to 
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advance the nuclear disarmament agenda, where Germany, the Netherlands and Poland cooperate 
with Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Turkey, and the United Arab 
Emirates (Dee 2012). It is possible that the specialization in the EU is embedded in such international 
groups. 
Dimension 5: exclusiveness 
To what extent is the informal arrangement open to all interested actors in the EU and, consequently, 
how stable is the dividing line between the insiders and the outsiders? First, participation can be open 
and evolving. Informal division of labour can indeed result in sub-groups of which the composition 
regularly changes and where member states (and the Commission and the EEAS) can join in case they 
are – or become – interested. In such cases, specialization does not necessarily result in secluded 
decision-making, but it is open for actors who want to join. However, joining an existing informal 
arrangement comes with a certain commitment. The actors who want to participate have to politically 
invest in the process by offering an asset (which can be diplomatic, material, cognitive or financial) 
that is considered relevant and valuable for what the leading actors are doing.  
 
Second, participation to the informal division of labour can also be closed and stable. In some cases, 
the informally divided task is conducted by a group of actors that remains exclusively limited to the 
initially participating actors. As a result, some actors are then closer involved in EU policy-making than 
others who do not join the inner circle or who are not accepted by these inner circle actors. The EU3 
format, used in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, is an example of such an exclusive arrangement. It 
is France, the UK and Germany, together with the HR/VP that have informally taken up the role of EU 
representatives. The other 25 member states are not – and are not likely to become – a member of 
that arrangement. Although it is probably less applicable in the EU3 example, such exclusive informal 
division of labour risks to be conceived as secluded ‘behind closed door’ decision-making among a 
number of privileged insiders. It has the potential to lead to a split in the EU between actors who are 
in the cockpit of policy-making and actors who are so dependent on them that they can only follow 
without having a real impact. 
Dimension 6: durability 
A final dimension on which cases of informal division of labour in the EU’s foreign policy-making vary 
is its degree of durability. First, when informally dividing the work serves as a practical solution for a 
single problem during a limited period of time, it is a ‘one shot’ phenomenon. When the problem at 
stake has been addressed or an international process has come to an end, the informal division of 
labour is then discontinued. In such cases, specialization is an ad hoc solution that is not common to 
the specific policy-making characteristics in a particular policy area or policy-making forum. 
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Second, in other cases, the phenomenon is more robust in nature as it is used as the principal 
‘modus operandi’ to address a particular issue. If that is the case, it has become an uncontested 
political practice or a standard operating procedure in a particular policy area or in a particular EU 
decision-making forum (such as a Council working group). The example of the lead negotiators in the 
climate change domain is again illustrative here. Although every rotating Presidency since 2004 had 
the formal opportunity to terminate the informal division of labour towards lead negotiators and to 
go back to the formal rules which would return the external representation power to the Presidency, 
none of them has done so. This indicates that the political practice of informally dividing the work has 
been deeply institutionalized in the WPIEI, albeit not in a written or formal way yet as a political 
practice proper to that setting. 
The dynamic nature of informal division of labour 
As informal division of labour reflects a political practice in the EU’s foreign policy-making, its exact 
manifestation and appearance can largely vary and evolve over time, even within the same policy field. 
Informal rules that structure the political practice can be modified rather swiftly as formal hurdles do 
not need to be taken. As a result, the way the six aforementioned dimensions characterize a particular 
instance of informal division of labour can vary over time. 
 
For instance, it is possible that the subject of specialization (dimension 3) evolves from mere policy 
preparation towards policy execution. As a result of that evolution, it can become more embedded in 
the institutional structure of the EU (dimension 4) because the EU’s institutions and the EU’s policy 
instruments are needed for the implementation. It is plausible that such a shift coincides with the 
informal arrangement becoming less exclusive, for instance because the Commission, as the 
administrator of the EU budget starts to participate (dimension 5). Temporal shifts on one dimension 
can thus trigger shifts on other dimensions, resulting in changing manifestations of how informal 
division of labour appears. Informal division of labour in EU foreign policy-making is thus a dynamic 
phenomenon. A snapshot of a particular moment in time does not necessarily provide the entire 
picture of what is actually going on. It also explains why we have portrayed the different 
manifestations of the phenomenon through six ‘dimensions’, implying variation and change, and not 
through for instance six ‘characteristics’. 
5. The effects of informal division of labour and specialization 
There are probably many effects of informal division of labour in EU foreign policy-making. Here we 
will pay attention to four effects: the strengthening of internal effectiveness, external effectiveness, 
internal legitimacy and external legitimacy. Whereas the effects relating to effectiveness reflect a 
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general understanding of the functions of informality in the literature, the effects on legitimacy can 
seem rather counterintuitive at first sight, but they should not be overlooked (Keukeleire 2001; 2006). 
Table 2 summarizes the four effects, which are then further elaborated below. 
 
 Effectiveness Legitimacy 
Internal overcoming policy-making hurdles increasing the attractiveness of the EU 
as foreign policy forum for member 
states 
External mobilizing the necessary resources increasing the attractiveness of the EU 
as foreign policy actor for third players 
Table 2: effects of informal division of labour in EU foreign policy-making 
Internal effectiveness 
‘Going informal’ enables the EU to overcome the hurdles of its formal institutional framework in 
foreign policy-making. This mirrors the functionalist view of EU informal governance: actors engage in 
practices based on informal division of labour because it makes policy-making more efficient (Héritier 
and Lehmkuhl 2011). In that sense, our observations on informality in EU foreign-policy making 
mirror a general trend in the EU that ‘to overcome the decision-making impasses [...] numerous 
forms of informal decision-making have emerged’ (Farrell and Héritier 2004: 1187). The need for 
more flexible policy-making mechanisms to overcome problems of deadlock on policy-making is also 
reinforced by the multitude of issues on the foreign policy agenda (Pfetsch 1998: 311) and by the 
growing complexity of policy implementation. In brief, informal division of labour often makes that 
the EU is able to formulate a foreign policy. 
 
There is, however, an important caveat. Informal division of labour only seems to lead to more 
internal effectiveness until a certain critical point of politicization. For instance, during the first days of 
the Copenhagen climate change conference, when the negotiations were conducted at the level of 
officials and diplomats, the EU used a relatively well-functioning system of lead negotiators. But when 
negotiations were taken over by ministers and ultimately even by heads of state and government – 
and when, consequently, the level of politicization raised – the informality disappeared and the 
internal effectiveness evaporated. Hence, the logic seems to be that the more the policy-making 
process becomes politicized, the more the actors in the EU fall back on their formal rights (such as 
veto power or the right to participate in international negotiations as a sovereign state). The more 
there is at stake for the member states (i.e. the higher the level of politicization), the more they want 
to keep control over the policy-making process and the less they accept that powers are exercised by 
actors to whom they did not formally delegate these powers. 
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External effectiveness 
The EU is in many cases able to act at the international scene because of the processes of informal 
division of labour and specialization. In other words, it not only enables the EU to overcome internal 
institutional obstacles and to generate policy outputs (i.e. internal effectiveness), but also to be a 
more significant international actor than the EU would have been in the absence of informal division 
of labour (i.e. external effectiveness). 
 
Informal division of labour implies that the most relevant stakeholders in the EU are brought together 
and that the EU can immediately and in flexible way mobilize those interests, expertise and 
(diplomatic, financial, material, immaterial or military) capabilities that are needed to increase its 
effectiveness with regard to influencing the external environment. This accounts for the realities of 
international negotiations and crises, where the often swiftly changing negotiation or crisis dynamics 
make it imperative that the EU is able to (re)act quickly. Having only a limited number of relevant 
actors involved allows for such flexibility. Such a quick (re)action is often impossible when 28 member 
states are directly involved or when the Commission, the EEAS or the Presidency have to spend most 
of their energy and time into internal consultation and coordination to the detriment of interaction 
with external actors. Informal division of labour also contributes to overcome the reluctance among a 
number of relevant actors to commit the necessary but often also costly or scarce resources, which 
can strengthen their general commitment and ‘activism’ to obtain the desired outcomes. 
Internal legitimacy 
The internal legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy-making refers to the legitimacy of foreign policy 
activities by the EU for the member states. EU’s foreign policy often suffers from problems with 
regard both input and output legitimacy. Informal division of labour can offer a solution that 
reinforces that internal legitimacy. In terms of internal ‘input legitimacy’, member states 
representatives often feel irrelevant in EU foreign policy-making. They experience that it is difficult to 
have an impact in meetings where 28 ministers, diplomats or civil servants sit around the table 
(together with representatives of the EU institutions). Likewise, when only the HR/VP, the 
Commission, the Presidency or an EEAS representative can formally take the floor, the role of 
member state representatives is limited to silent observers. The internal legitimacy can also be 
undermined when member states have the (often correct) impression that some of their major policy 
priorities or concerns are not seen as important by the majority of other member states who do not 
really care and who thus also do not want to commit resources to tackle that policy issue. In these 
cases, it is not the existence of conflicting interests among member states, but rather the lack of 
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interest in other member states which can lead to EU inaction – and thus to frustration in those 
countries which had expected more operational action (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 125-6). 
 
Informal division of labour can contribute to tackle some of these internal legitimacy problems by 
enhancing the feeling of ownership among a number of relevant actors. It allows member states to be 
relevant players on specific issues and to have a real impact on the negotiations in smaller settings. As 
the Core Group on Somalia demonstrated, it also allows them to move the EU towards operational 
action on issues which they consider as important, making the EU an attractive forum to conduct 
their foreign policy. Two caveats have to be formulated here. First, informal division of labour can 
only increase the internal legitimacy when a lack of interest (and not conflicting interests) is at the 
basis of EU inaction. Second, when informal division of labour leads to secluded decision-making 
because it is too exclusive (see above), it can also undermine internal legitimacy. However, the latter 
can be compensated if informal division of labour leads to a stronger output legitimacy, for instance 
by making EU action more effective or visible. For instance, successes of the EU3 negotiations with 
Iran are likely to mirror positively on the EU as a whole, which positively affects the EU’s output 
legitimacy for the member states.  
External legitimacy 
The external legitimacy refers to the EU’s legitimacy as foreign policy actors in the eyes of external 
stakeholders (i.e. third countries or international institutions targeted by EU foreign policy and 
particularly other major international players such as the US). This external legitimacy can be fostered 
too as a result of informal division of labour. The EU’s formal arrangements, for instance on external 
representation in foreign policy matters, do not always correspond the expectations and needs of 
external actors, which often prefer that the relevant member states and EU institutionals are directly 
involved. The rationale is that the EU is often only taken seriously when they key actors are involved. 
Within the EU, they are the actors who can make a difference through their expertise or capabilities, 
as a result of their historical link with a region or because of their track-record in a specific 
international negotiation. Likewise, when the EU’s external representation is subject to informal 
division of labour, it also guarantees continuity in the way the EU represented at the international 
level (Delreux and Van den Brande 2013). 
 
For instance, in the case of the EU Core Group on Somalia, the EU’s external legitimacy was 
strengthened as this core group guaranteed the involvement of the two countries with clear historical 
links, expertise and resources that were relevant for the conflict (the UK and Italy), a country with a 
both a high credibility and a considerable budget for mediation and conflict management (Sweden) 
and an institutional actor with both expertise and budgetary resources (the Commission). Pushing 
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this argument even further, it can be argued that not having these actors involved would have raised 
questions about the EU’s legitimacy as foreign policy actors because it would not be clear whether the 
EU’s formal representatives were sufficiently backed by the relevant EU member states. 
6. Conclusions: the way forward 
Underneath the visible and formal ‘common’ foreign policy of the EU, more segmented policy-making 
appears, based on informal division of labour and specialisation. This paper provided a framework for 
better understanding this increasingly important phenomenon. The framework aims to serve as a 
starting point for further work on this topic in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding. 
 
Given the lack of empirical knowledge of where and how informal division of labour occurs in EU 
foreign policy-making, it is clear that more empirical studies are needed. They should pursue four 
objectives. First, other areas of EU foreign policy-making where the informal division of labour is an 
important feature should be identified. The mere identification of informal practices is already a major 
issue (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). The framework presented in this paper is based on observations in 
two particular subfields of EU foreign policy – CFSP and external climate change policy – and there 
are indications that such dynamics also occur in other contexts (Carbone 2013; Laatikainen 
forthcoming). However, we need a more comprehensive picture of where and how informal division 
of labour is employed in EU foreign policy-making. Second, the manifestations of informal division of 
labour in other areas should be mapped against the dimensions and the effects we identified. In that 
sense, adding columns to our Table 1 (see above) and filling them with empirical findings will allow us 
to construct a more comprehensive picture of the phenomenon. Such an exercise could also reveal 
the need to refine our framework in the light of the new empirical findings. Indeed, it might well be 
the case that there are additional dimensions at work which could not be identified on the basis of 
our observations. Third, more empirical work should be done on how the various dimensions interact. 
Do certain dimensions recurrently occur in the same combinations? If patterns of such interactions 
can indeed be found, our framework can be used as the basis for building a typology of informal 
division of labour in EU foreign policy-making. Fourth, the link and the causal mechanisms between 
the six dimensions of how informal division of labour manifests itself and the effects of the 
phenomenon is a promising venue for future research. This is likely to strengthen our understanding 
how the institutional design of policy-making affects the substance of policy outcomes. 
 
Empirical research on such informal practices implies methodological challenges. As long as scholars 
are not sufficiently aware that rather invisible, informal practices occur, they are likely to overlook its 
importance. One of the main problems in such research is indeed tracing informal practices 
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empirically (Kleine 2013). We therefore argue that future research should explicitly explore 
indications of informal division of labour. In that sense, participatory or non-participatory observation 
might be revealing starting points for empirical research. Our experiences suggest that this was a 
necessary step to become aware that the phenomenon exists. It has increased our awareness and it 
has pointed us to political dynamics that we would probably not have found without such direct 
observations. Moreover, it enabled us to construct an interview protocol with the relevant questions 
that we subsequently used to collect qualitative data on the phenomenon through semi-structured 
interviews with closely involved policy-makers. Immediately starting with empirical data collection by 
only conducting interviews entails that risks that researchers do not ask the pertinent questions and 
that interviewees do not spontaneously mention the occurrence of such processes as they could fear 
to be accused of secluded or illegitimate political practices. 
 
Starting from methodologically sound, empirical research, informal division of labour in EU foreign 
policy-making should then be theorized. We see two particularly fruitful avenues for embedding these 
empirical insights theoretically. First, whereas in our previous analysis we portrayed EU foreign policy 
as multi-faceted, multi-method and multi-level (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 11-18), it seems 
promising to conceptualize EU foreign policy as multi-network. Echoing the observation that the EU 
can be seen ‘as a system of multiple networks’ (Kohler-Koch 2005: 36), our observations on informal 
division of labour could be further conceptualized in terms of network governance. This literature is 
likely to provide useful insights on the driving factors and on the nature of informal division of labour 
and specialization in EU foreign policy-making. Second, one particularly fruitful avenue is theoretically 
informed research on the conditions under which a particular manifestation or a particular effect of 
the phenomenon is more likely. Small-N comparative analyses are well suited for identifying such 
patterns of conditions. Doing so, the inductive approach of this paper is intended as a first and 
necessary step for more deductive analyses that could contribute to the literature on informal 
governance in the EU and to a sharper understanding on the effects of informal governance for the 
nature, functioning, legitimacy and effectiveness of the EU as such. 
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